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Despite the chronic violence that has characterized the Colombian political system during the 
second half of the twentieth century through to the present, the electoral process has unfolded in a 
context of open competition between parties and candidates, a relative absence of fraud, and the 
legitimacy of winning candidates. Clearly, elections represent a fundamental component of any 
democratic system, and without them no system can be labelled democratic.1 Yet as Guillermo 
O’Donnell has argued persuasively, Latin American democracies manifest their own idiosyncrasies 
despite their having emerged from an accepted electoral process.2 Consequently, elections and their 
repercussions represent key topics of any research agenda focusing upon democratic political 
systems.  
 
However, the literature on electoral behaviour, with a few exceptions, has emerged from studies of 
democracies characterized by a high degree of political stability. Likewise, electoral analyses in 
countries under stress or crisis usually subscribe to the same theoretical and methodological 
tendencies without examining the impact of political crises upon electoral outcomes and their 
impact on electoral behaviour. Political systems confronting crises (“…a situation where the 
political or economic system is confronted with challenges with which existing institutions and 
organisations are potentially unable to cope”.),3 represent a distinct context in which elections 
assume additional consequences for the survival or collapse of existing democratic institutions.  
 
Although the Colombian polity seemingly is in a perpetual state of crisis,  its democratic institutions 
and economic growth rates have been relatively impressive in comparison to other Latin American 
countries. However, that scenario began to change in the 1990s with mounting pressure for political 
reform and the onset of unfavourable economic indicators – per capita income, the gini index of 
inequality, employment rates, and the GDP (in 1999 economic growth was a negative 4.5%) 
deteriorated markedly. These negative indicators were accompanied by an incomplete and 
contentious shift in Colombia’s development model toward a more open economy and an increased 
reliance upon the market as outlined in the Washington consensus.  
 
A considerable portion of the stress confronting the political system relates to the ongoing violence 
perpetuated by guerrilla groups, principally the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC) and the Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN), right-wing paramilitary groups, and 
common criminals devoted to narcotrafficking, kidnapping, and armed attacks on civilians. From its 
inception in 1998, the Pastrana government promoted a peace process with the FARC, yet those 
negotiations were terminated abruptly by the government in February, 2002, giving rise to a period 
of conflict escalation that pervaded the congressional (March) and presidential (May) elections.  In 
part because of his hard line stance toward the guerrillas and criticism of Pastrana’s peace process, 
Álvaro Uribe Vélez won an overwhelming victory in the first round of the presidential election. 4  
 
                                                 
1 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. 
2 Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 5 (1994). 
3 Crisis States Programme, ‘Concepts and Research Agenda’, Working Paper No. 1,  London: Development Research 
Centre (LSE), April 2001. 
4 Gary Hoskin, Miguel García & Rodolfo Masías, La decisión de voto en las elecciones presidenciales de 2002’, in 
Gary Hoskin, Miguel García, and Rodolfo Masías (eds), Colombia 2002: Elecciones, comportamiento electoral, y 
democracia, Bogotá: Departament of Political Science, University of the Andes and Editorial Corcas, 2003. 
 The war in Colombia has been intensifying, and it is increasingly apparent that the State is 
encountering difficulty in maintaining its presence and preserving the state of law in many parts of 
the country. At the same time, non-institutional groups (the guerrillas, paramilitary and narco-
organizations) have been consolidating their control over wide areas, in ways that have gone 
beyond mere military domination. In this context, it is worth analysing the democratic process in a 
country where it is constantly under siege from the effects of war. For more than ten years now, the 
influence of that war has manifested itself in regional and local governments, as governors and 
mayors have been the leading victims of the conflict. The non-traditional parties have been affected 
most severely, the classical case being the physical elimination of many members of the Unión 
Patriótica (UP).5 But in recent years the impact of the war has reached the national level, especially 
affecting congress people.  
 
This study analyses the impact of the war on political participation in the March 2002 elections to 
the lower house of the Colombian Congress. The specific research question is whether the dynamics 
of violence in Colombia has affected the way voters behaved in those elections. In order to provide 
some answers, this article seeks to pinpoint the relationship between war and democracy by 
focusing upon a key component of democratic regimes, namely political participation. 
 
The article is organized in five sections. The first consists of a theoretical overview of democracy 
and political participation. The second section, drawn principally from the press, provides evidence 
of the impact of the war upon the congressional and presidential campaigns. The third part discusses 
the evolution of political participation in Colombia. The fourth section is a quantitative analysis of 
the relationship between violence and political participation. Finally, the last section offers some 
conclusions about political participation and violence in Colombia. 
 
 
Democracy and Political Participation 
The impact of political participation in democratic regimes is ambiguous, in part because of 
differing conceptualisations not only of political participation but democracy as well. To 
oversimplify, most definitions of democracy fall within three broad categories: (1) a formal 
definition that focuses upon the mechanics of liberal democracy, (2) a substantive definition that not 
only includes the first but also emphasizes a socio-economic component, and (3) an approach that 
underscores the creation of and an emphasis upon an active citizenry. 6 The formal definition, 
generally associated with the Anglo-American tradition, generally includes such variables as 
competitive elections involving two or more political parties, regularly elected leaders, a relatively 
unrestricted adult franchise, secret ballots that are not coerced, and citizens and leaders who enjoy 
basic freedom of speech, press, assembly, and organisation. 7 In this literature, linked to the theories 
of Joseph Schumpeter, Giovanni Sartori, and Robert Dahl, democratic participation revolves around 
periodic election of leaders who represent interests of the citizenry. In contrast, the substantive 
conceptualisation underscores the responsibility of the leaders to provide citizens with the basic 
necessities of life; if a democratic regime fails to do so, then it does not merit the label democratic.8 
The third approach to defining democracy focuses upon the educative role of the regime in 
promoting active citizen involvement in democratic politics. This tradition, rooted in the writings of 
Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, and G.D.H. Cole, has experienced a rebirth in the form of participatory 
                                                 
5 Unión Patriótica was a political movement supported by FARC during the negotiations between the guerri llas and the 
Betancur Administration. 
6 See David Held, Models of Democracy , Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987. 
7 G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies:  Participation, Stability, and Violence, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982, p. 3. 
8 John Peeler, Latin American Democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1985, Chapter 1. 
 democracy as expressed in contemporary constitutional engineering in several Latin American 
countries. 
 
Each of these models of democracy is an ‘ideal type’ in Weberian terms, not corresponding 
perfectly to empirical realities; that is, any democratic regime involves a mixture of the components 
of the three conceptualisations. As Seymour Martin Lipset argued in his classic study, a democratic 
regime is not likely to enjoy a long life if it does not elicit a high degree of legitimacy from its 
citizens, which, almost inevitably, involves some attention on the part of the regime to socio-
economic problems of the society, as well as to educating citizens for democratic participation. 9  
 
Nonetheless, each of these conceptualisations of democracy carries with it very different 
implications as to the significance of political participation for promoting democratic consolidation. 
The so-called realists of the formal tradition maintain that viable democratic regimes are not 
dependent upon high levels of participation. In fact, the opposite may be the case in the sense that 
“excessive” participation may undermine regime stability. This thesis is expressed in terms of 
“governmental overload” or sometimes as a “crisis of governability”. 10 Western democracies, 
according to the realists, are being undermined by high levels of participation that place demands on 
governments that they cannot fulfil. Although the appropriate forms and levels of participation 
remain somewhat ambiguous, clearly the focus is upon electoral participation rather than other 
forms of citizen involvement. In contrast, the substantive and participatory traditions bring to the 
foreground the direct and active participation of citizens in democratic systems that goes beyond the 
electoral dimension. Emphasis is placed upon the creation of a democratic political culture and a 
vibrant civil society that not only promotes a politically active citizenry but also holds governmental 
leaders accountable. In summary, the realists are relatively content with moderate levels of electoral 
participation, thereby insulating governmental elites from excessive citizen demands, while those 
promoting direct democracy extol the virtues of extensive and intensive citizen participation on a 
variety of dimensions.  
 
The act of political participation may serve multiple functions in a democratic system. At the macro 
level, participation is conducive to the election of political leaders, the expression of individual and 
group interests, and the generation of regime legitimacy. At the micro level, participation offers 
individuals an opportunity to develop and express civic virtues, to identify with the democratic rules 
of the game, to manifest their satisfaction or disgruntlement with political leaders and, in some 
cases, participate directly in decision-making. For those groups of people who are relatively 
dispossessed, political participation may offer an avenue of socio-economic advancement. 
Likewise, those who enjoy economic and political status may further augment their advantageous 
positions through political participation. That is to say, those who are highly educated and 
economically powerful may increase their benefits by means of participating in politics.11  
 
People participate in politics for diverse reasons. Some become involved for instrumental reasons; 
that is, their participation is intended to promote or defend their goals with the minimum of costs 
and the maximum of effect. This type of participation may be altruistic or self- interested or a 
mixture of both. 12 This is the predominant research orientation in political science to explain why 
people participate in politics. There are two major variants of the instrumental explanation. The first 
argues that there are a number of social forces that have an impact on the general outlook people 
have on politics that can be captured by a socio-economic status model, which effectively predicts 
                                                 
9 Seymour Martín Lipset, Political Man, Garden City: Doubleday, 1960. 
10 Michael Crozier, Samuel Huntington & Joji Watanuki, Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral 
Commission, New York: New York University Press, 1975. 
11 Alessandro Pizzorno, cited in Geraint Parry, George Moyser & Neil Day, Political Participation and Democracy in 
Britain, New York: Ca mbridge University Press, 1992, p. 6.  
12 Parry et al. (1992), p. 9. 
 participation. 13 A second involves the formulation of formal or rational models to analyse the 
motives behind participation at the micro level, which is also concerned with macro level effects.14  
 
Another motivation for participation in politics has been labelled communitarian, in which actors 
express a concern, in a non- instrumental manner, for the community of which they are a part. This 
form of participation is not limited to a geographical context; it may occur in academic, religious or 
business communities.15 A third constellation of variables centres on educative factors; participation 
is viewed as an educational experience, leading to self-development of citizens.16 It is not only the 
results but also the process of participation that is conducive to the development of an active, 
involved citizenry. Finally, the act of participation may be an expressive experience; that is, people 
may participate in order to display their feelings without any expectation of having an impact on 
policy. Examples might inc lude singing the national anthem, attending the funeral of a prominent 
political figure, appearing in a rally for victims of a catastrophe.17  
 
The extent of political participation is dependent upon a combination of four factors: (1) the 
opportunity structure associated with the political system; (2) the strength and development of civil 
society; (3) micro level attitudinal syndromes; and (4) the incidence and salience of issues in 
specific contexts. If a political system offers extensive opportunities for participation – frequent 
elections at all levels with meaningful choices, accessible and responsible politicians, and direct 
citizen participation in decision-making through referenda, recall, and plebiscites – then the level of 
citizen involvement will be considerably higher than in those systems without such opportunities. 
Likewise, participation is likely to be more pronounced in those political systems where civil 
society is highly structured, facilitating the formation of interest groups and civic associations that 
seek to have an impact on policy formation. Micro level factors also have a heavy impact on 
participation – individuals who are apathetic, alienated, and lacking in efficacy tend not to 
participate in politics. The costs of individual participation – material, such as transportation and 
information, as well as psychological – likewise influence the decision to vote, attend a protest 
march, or visit representatives. In short, participation in politics depends upon a complex, 
interdependent set of variables ranging from characteristics of the political system, the structure of 
civil society, individual level factors, and issue generation.  
 
Political participation assumes distinctive forms that tend to cluster together, often involving little 
overlap between activities in the different clusters. Researchers have identified four conventional 
modes of participation: voting, campaign activity, communal activity, and contacting officials on 
personal matters:18  
 
Separate participation modes exist because political activities differ systematically in 
the requirements they place on the citizen and how the activities relate the individual to 
government. Some activities are very demanding and may require a high level of 
political sophistication; other forms of political participation are fairly routine.19  
 
Thus voting, generally the most common form of democratic participation, is relatively easy, while 
communal and campaign activities tend to be more demanding. Variables that explain conventional 
                                                 
13 For a classic statement of the socio-economic model, see Sidney Verba & Norman Nie, Participation in America:  
Political Democracy and Social Equality, New York: Harper and Row, 1972. 
14 For an excellent analysis that relies upon a rational model to explain democratic behaviour, see Adam Przeworski, 
Democracy and the Market , New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, Chapter 1. 
15 Parry et al. (1992). 
16 For a classic statement of this treatment of participation, see Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970. 
17 Parry et al. (1992). 
18 Russell Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies, Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, 1988, p.36. 
19 Dalton (1988). 
 participation vary in intensity not only according to the cluster but also the context in which they 
occur.  
 
Non-conventional modes of participation are assuming greater significance in democratic regimes – 
activities such as signing petitions, participating in demonstrations, joining boycotts, participating 
in unofficial strikes, occupying buildings, damaging property, and personal violence.20 These forms 
of participation reflect an increasing disillusionment with traditional politics – political parties, 
governmental leaders, corruption, nepotism, and bureaucratic inefficiency – along with an 
increasing sophistication of the citizenry not content with solely relying upon traditional 
mechanisms of representative democracy to express their political preferences. This new style of 
politics often implies a direct confrontation of citizens with political elites rather than working 
within the confines of the established rules of the game, perhaps leading to undermining the status 
quo. The structure of representative democracy that evolved during the nineteenth century has not 
adapted overly well to the dramatic changes that characterize contemporary Western democracies. 
No longer are all citizens content with casting a vote for elected public officials – many want to 
partic ipate more directly in policy decisions and expect considerably more from government. Thus 
democratic systems are in the throes of transition from representative to more participatory forms of 
democracy, accompanied by the formidable tensions and anxieties associated therewith. But as 
Dalton argues, “…change may be threatening to some, and it does present a risk – but change is 
necessary”. 21 
 
Irrespective of the form of political participation, be it conventional or non-conventional, it should 
be emphasized that most people do not participate in politics for a variety of reasons.  
 
A Mounting Siege upon Colombia’s Democracy 
Although it is true that the actions of the armed groups, guerrillas and paramilitaries, against 
political representatives are nothing new, until a few years ago their focus was basically on local 
officials and politicians. Only recently the list of political victims of the war has been extended to 
contain more congressmen. The murder of representative and Peace Commission Chairman Diego 
Turbay-Cote in January 200122 was the beginning of a tragic period for congressmen, whose 
situation during the last election campaign was in some cases that of direct persecution by armed 
groups. Turbay´s death was followed by three others in 2001: Jorge Rojas, also Chairman of the 
Representatives´ Peace Commission, and two representatives of Arauca, Octavio Sarmiento and 
Luis Alfredo Colmenares. The paramilitaries claimed responsibility for the Arauca murders. This 
strategy of assassinating regional leaders was linked to an initiation of their activities in the 
department, as had transpired previously in other areas of the country.  
 
Persecution and murder of congressmen has been complemented during the last year and a half by 
another form of aggression, namely selective kidnappings. Although in June 2001 the government 
and FARC implemented an agreement to exchange kidnapped policemen and soldiers for a group of 
guerrillas, it was obvious that the guerrillas wanted to promote a second exchange that would allow 
a larger number of guerrillas to be released from prisons. In addition to a group of police and army 
officers it held in custody, the FARC expanded the list of kidnapped victims eligible for exchange 
in 2001 by including senators and representatives in order to increase pressure on the government. 
Toward the end of the year, the FARC had in their possession the following congresspersons: Luis 
Eladio Perez, Orlando Beltran, Consuelo Gonzalez and Oscar Tulio Lizcano. The list of captives 
                                                 
20 Dalton (1988), p.65. 
21 Dalton (1988), p.244. 
22 The murder of Turbay marked the end of a Liberal dynasty in the southern department of Caquetá, an area with a 
strong presence of the FARC. Some years before,  Diego Turbay’s brother died in the hands of his FARC kidnappers. 
Turbay´s mother, also an active member of the political clan, was killed at the same time as Diego. 
 expanded in 2001 to include Jorge Eduardo Gechem-Turbay, a representative and candidate for the 
Senate,23 presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, her campaign manager, twelve departmental 
assemblymen from Valle, and Guillermo Gaviria, Governor of Antioquia, and his Peace Adviser 
Gilberto Echeverri (FARC assassinated both during the military’s failed rescue attempt in May, 
2003).  
 
The impact of violence on the normal course of the election campaigns was reflected in the 
numerous complaints lodged by congressional candidates that they had been vetoed by one or 
another armed group and enjoyed no access to certain parts of the country. Indeed, for many 
candidates their campaigns were restricted to the major cities, which have so far been left more or 
less on the sidelines of the war. Conservative candidate Francisco Murgueíto, for example, said that 
he could not campaign in Jamundi or Dagua in Valle del Cauca because of the presence of drug-
traffickers and guerrillas. 
 
Indigenous Senator Jesus Piñacue was threatened by paramilitaries and declared a military target by 
the FARC. Left-wing candidate Gloria Cuartas complained of pressure from both the guerrillas and 
the paramilitaries on her campaigns24. Senator Miguel Pinedo related that campaigning in 
Magdalena was restricted because of the presence of armed groups, and that only seven of its 
municipalities were “democratic territory”. Finally, Liberal José Renán Trujillo reacted to the 
insecurity by asking theElectoral Council for protection to enable candidates to campaign freely.  25 
Activities of the guerrillas and paramilitaries directed against politicians clearly show that the 2002 
elections were under siege. But this picture should be complemented by an account of the most 
important actions taken by the armed groups to hamper candidates´ movements, frustrate their 
campaigns and obstruct voter participation.  
 
Between January and May 2002, the national and regional press reported a series of events designed 
to prevent the normal evolution of the campaigns and the electoral process in general. During the 
pre-election period campaign headquarters of presidential candidates and some congressional 
candidates were attacked or threatened. Álvaro Uribe´s headquarters in Villavicencio was closed 
because of threats, and his offices in Medellín, Eastern Antioquia and Northern Caldas also were 
threatened. A few days before the presidential elections, Uribe´s offices in Valledupar and Medellín 
were bombed. The Popayán office of left-wing candidate Luis Eduardo Garzón received a bomb 
threat.26 Álvaro Uribe experienced the largest number of attacks, the most serious occurring in 
Barranquilla on 15 April. 
 
In a different form of action, dissemination of propaganda and information about candidates for the 
presidency and Congress attracted the censorship of the armed groups. The best-known instances of 
this were the bans on radio broadcasts and promotion of candidates opposed to the interests of the 
armed groups. One of the most dramatic of these was that of radio announcer Juan Carlos Gomez in 
Aguachia (Cesar), who was murdered, supposedly for having read a communiqué from Liberal 
candidate Horacio Serpa, after the paramilitaries had forbidden the broadcasting of any material 
about that candidate.27 
 
Actions of the guerrillas and paramilitaries directed against candidates and their campaign 
organisations were complemented by large-scale voter intimidation. These actions were of two 
                                                 
23 This kidnapping was one of the factors that led the Pastrana government to break off the peace talks with FARC.  
24 ‘Cuartas promete trabajo por las mujeres y la paz’, El Tiempo, 28 January 2002, pp. 1-12. 
25 ‘Piden garantías electorales’, El País, 23 January 2002, p. A-5. 
26 During the campaign authorities uncovered plots to murder presidential candidates Álvaro Uribe and Horacio Serpa , 
along with Serpa´s running-mate, Jose Gregorio Hernández. Authorities also reported that there had been attempts to 
murder congressmen Gustavo Petro and Jimmy Chamorro. 
27 The ELN forbade radio stations in Ocaña, Norte de Santander to broadcast any messages from the Uribe campaign. 
As Uribe himself noted during his campaign, thirty-three stations refused to receive his radio spots.  
 kinds: one forced people to vote for a specific candidate and the other simply prevented them from 
casting a vote. 
 
The first type of pressure, apparently promoted by the paramilitaries, produced express instructions 
not to vote for specific candidates, especially Horacio Serpa.28 The FARC and ELN encouraged 
people not to vote for Uribe. An El Tiempo report said that the paramilitaries had obliged people to 
vote for Uribe in Magdalena, César, Casanare, southern Bolívar and the Middle Magdalena Valley, 
while FARC “encouraged” them not to vote for Uribe in Meta, Caquetá, Cauca, Nariño, Putumayo, 
Huila and Guaviare. This pressure from paramilitaries resulted from attempts to promote candidates 
at the national level sympathetic to their cause. The same report related that according to 
government sources thirteen senators and twenty representatives elected on 10 March 2003 were 
directly related to the interests of the paramilitaries.29 
 
On the other hand, instead of sponsoring specific candidates, the FARC started a campaign to 
sabotage the elections and the candidacy of Álvaro Uribe. They not only promoted abstention from 
congressional and presidential elections,30 the FARC actively hampered the process by staging a 
number of armed blockades of highways and committing acts of terrorism. Highways in the 
departments of Arauca, Putumayo and Caquetá were blocked a few days before the elections, as a 
result of actions that prevented people from travelling, complemented by dynamiting transmission 
towers. To combat the Uribe campaign the guerrillas mounted a campaign to intimidate voters. In 
some parts of the country they expressly ordered people no t to vote for that candidate31. 
 
The scenario presented thus far reveals an obvious assault upon Colombia’s democracy, especially 
with reference to the opportunity for free and open elections. The foregoing represents the context 
in which political participation unfolded during the 2002 Colombian elections that will be analysed 
in subsequent sections of this paper. However, a qualification is in order before beginning the 
analysis, namely the number of municipalities and potential voters affected directly by the violence 
                                                 
28 The Liberal Party´s Electoral Monitoring Committee denounced the fact that due to pressures from the guerrillas and 
paramilitaries, party militants were unable to canvass for support in 205 municipalities. The departments most affected 
were Antioquia, Magdalena, Cauca, Cundinamarca, César, Santander and Tolima. See ‘Veto a liberals en 205 
municipios’,’ El Tiempo,  16 May 2002, pp. 1-15. 
29 ‘El veredicto de los violentos’, El Tiempo, 21 April 2002,  pp.1-18.  These accusations were confirmed by the 
Minister of the Interior Armando Estrada, who revealed that “The paramilitaries took advantage of the March elections 
to establish a lobby for them in Congress (…) the fact is that they organised no sabotages against the elections  but tried 
to use them for their benefit and for their own candidates, and this means that they now manifest a more political  than 
military or anti-guerrilla orientation. Piedad Córdoba and Julio César Guerra, both members of Congress, lodged a 
protest, specifying names of individuals, their trajectories and voting records, and the places they were elected to 
represent, as being places under paramilitary influence. This leads to the conclusion that the paramilitaries ordered 
people to vote for them or they made agreements so that the paramilitaries would exert pressure for them in the 
community to vote for certain names”. See ‘AUC acomodaron puntales en el Congreso: Mininterior’, El Colombiano, 4 
April 2002, p.8-A. But paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño emphasised that his organisation had not tried to exert 
pressure on  voters, saying, “Out of conviction, we in the AUC undertake to respect the free exercise of democracy in 
next Sunday´s presidential elections. He invited “…all Colombians, especially inhabitants of places where we have a 
social and political presence, to enjoy their right to exercise their vote and to take part in this spectacle of demo cracy”. 
See, ‘Guerrilla llama a no votar y ‘paras’ instan a sufragar’, Vanguardia Liberal , 23 May 2002, p. 2 A.  
30 A guerrilla communiqué published in a regional newspaper said that, “We call on our people not to vote, not to take 
part in the electoral farce on May 26, and to utilize abstention as an instrument of the struggle against economic, social, 
and cultural exclusion of the present regime”. See ‘Guerrilla llama a no votar y ‘paras’ instan a sufraga’, Vanguardia 
Liberal, 23 May 2002, p. 2-A. One day before the congressional elections, there were accusations that FARC had 
retained peoples’ identity cards in the department of Nariño, so that they would be unable to vote. ‘Ataques de las 
FARC antes de las elecciones’, El Tiempo, 10 March 2002, pp.1-17.  
31 In a few of Cundinamarca’s muncipalities (San Juanito, El Calvario, Villeta, Une, Chaguani, Viani, San Juan de 
Rioseco and La Mesa), the 22nd and 53rd FARC fronts  publicly announced that people should not support Uribe’s 
candidacy and,  if they did, they would face reprisals. ‘Si votan nos volvemos a ver’, El Tiempo, 10 April  2002, pp.1-
10. 
 from the right and left represent a relatively small proportion of the total vote, which tends to be 
concentrated in urban areas.  
 
 
Political Participation in Colombia 
Electoral participation in Colombia historically has been low in comparison to other Latin 
American countries.  The average turnout for presidential elections between the 1940s and the end 
of the last century was 40.74%, the lowest of twelve countries in the region, which averaged 56.9% 
(Table 1). Colombia’s relatively low participation rate may be attributed in part to the fact that the 
vote is not compulsory, whereas the vote is obligatory in many of the countries listed in Table 1. 
Participation levels have not changed much since the 1950s, and constitute a part of the country´s 
political culture. In 1974 Latorre observed that abstention is a tradition in Colombia and suggested 
that this was neither a rational decision on the part of citizens nor an expression of civil protest 
against the system. 32  
 
Table 1 - Percentage of Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections in Latin America (1940s-1990s) 
(Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (Idea), Voter Turnout from 1945 to date, A 
Global Report on Political Participation, obtained on 20 April 2001 from http://www.int-
idea.se/voter_turnout/index.html) 
 
Country Turnout 
Argentina 69.29% 
Bolivia  65.30% 
Brazil 44.93% 
Chile 50.26% 
Colombia 40.74% 
Costa Rica 68.91% 
Ecuador 50.59% 
México 51.62% 
Paraguay 55.15% 
Perú 45.25% 
Uruguay 68.40% 
Venezuela  72.42% 
Average 56.90% 
 
 
 
Voter turnout in the 1990s shows a series of fluctuations, which are small, but worth underscoring. 
First, at the local level (mayoral elections) the turnout in 1988 and 1990 was quite high and then 
steadily declined until reaching the levels experienced in national elections (Presidency and 
Congress). This mounting abstention in local elections is interesting, considering that the first two 
mayoral elections were characterized by high turnout. Following Gutierrez’ argument, local level 
elections may reflect voters’ perceptions of the utility of the new representative local government 
organisations, along with the new leaders, but interest quickly diminished because of a recognition 
that local government organisations failed to offer solutions to key problems for the public.33  From 
another perspective, maybe the new organisations became more absorbed in routine matters, to the 
point that they lost their power to attract new groups of citizens, and initial participatory enthusiasm 
waned as the new organisations and their leaders became just another part of the political system. 
 
                                                 
32 Mario Latorre, Elecciones y partidos políticos en Colombia ,  Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 1974, p.278. 
33 Francisco Gutiérrez, ‘Dilemas y paradojas de la transición participativa’, Análisis Político , 29 (September-December 
1996),  pp. 39 & 45. 
 A different explanation of local- level abstention might be related to an intensification of political 
violence. In other words, low turnout at the polls may be linked to pressures from armed groups on 
the political system. 34  In the 2000 local and regional elections, for example, armed groups 
reportedly attempted to intimidate voters and impose their own candidates. This situation prompted 
the Federation of Municipalities to ask for a suspension of the elections in some places. The 
combination of attempts to stifle competition and participation led the government to transfer 576 
polling booths from rural to urban areas, but this affected only 0.5% of potential electors.35 
 
Table 2 - Abstention Rates in three types of Elections, 1988 – 2002 
(Sources:  President and senators, Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (Civil Records Office), ‘Elecciones 2002’, at 
http://www.registraduria.gov.co/; mayors (except 2000) Cristina Querubín, María Fernanda Sánchez and Ileana Kure, 
‘Dinamica de las elecciones populares de alcaldes 1988-1997’, in Andrés Dávila and Ana María Bejarano (eds.), 
Elecciones y democracia en Colombia 1997-1998, Bogotá: Uniandes, Fundación Social, 1998) 
 
President  
Round 1.  Round 2* Senate  Mayors  
1988 i.e.**.  i.e. **. 33.2 
1990 56.1  n.d. 42.3 
1991 i.e. **  64.9 I.e.**. 
1992 n.e. **  n.e**. 56.6 
1994 66.0 56.68 67.2 54.5 
1997 n.e**  n.e**. 55.4 
1998 48.4 40.99 57.4 n.e**. 
2000 i.e.**.  n.e**. 47.3*** 
2002 53.5  58.1 n.e. 
 
*The second round was introduced in the 1991 Constitution and first applied for the 1994 presidential elections. There 
was no second round in 2002 because Álvaro Uribe won in the first round, with more than 50% of the total vote. 
**No elections held for this post/collegiate body. 
***This information was reported by the Civil Records Office and, unlike the other measures of abstention, is calculated 
on the total number of votes cast (including those for candidates, blank,  null , and unmarked ballots) and not just on the 
total vote cast for candidates and on blank ballots.  Inclusion of the larger number of votes reduces the percentage of 
abstention.  
 
 
The five departments that reported the highest levels of abstention in the 2002 elections for the 
Senate suggest that in some cases a relationship exists between a low turnout and the activities and 
presence of armed groups. As Table 2 shows, the overall abstention rate for 2002 was 58.06%. But 
in the five departments with the highest abstention rates (Atlántico, Guaviare, Caquetá, Chocó and 
Putumayo) each registered a rate of over 64%. In two of them, Caquetá and Putumayo, there was a 
strong and active presence of the guerrillas, but not of the paramilitaries. In contrast, the 
paramilitaries are strong in some departments with below average abstention, and the guerrillas are 
relatively weak there.  For example, Córdoba reported an abstention rate of 49.06% and Sucre 
47.19%, both around 10% below the national average.  In guerrilla-dominated areas restrictions on 
participation are more evident than in those areas in which the paramilitaries have consolidated their 
position, suggesting that armed groups adopt different strategies of relating to the political system.   
As some of the events described earlier suggest, the guerrillas were more interested in undermining 
the elections and promoting abstention, while the paramilitaries developed a strategy of influencing 
the results of the elections rather than frustrating them. This apparent relationship between the 
presence and actions of an armed group and levels of abstention will be examined empirically later 
in this paper. 
                                                 
34 Eduardo Pizarro & Ana Maria Bejarano, ‘De la democracia “restringida” a la democracia “asediada”. Para entender la 
crisis de la democracia en Colombia’, unpublished paper, 2001.  
35 Ruben Sánchez, ‘Vision global del proceso electoral del 29 de octubre de 2000’, in Colombia elecciones 2000, 
Bogotá: Universidad Javeriana, Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil and Fundación Konrad Adenauer, 2001, p. 15. 
  
A second factor regarding fluctuations in turnout rates is related to the lower levels of abstention for 
the 1998 presidential and senatorial elections compared to both 1990 and 1994. In 1998, abstention 
for the senate elections fell by 10 points, and by more than 10 points for the presidential election. 
The 2002 results show that, although abstention was slightly higher (especially in the presidential 
election) than in 1998, the trend continued, perhaps resulting from an increase in voters’ perceptions 
of the credibility of and satisfaction with the democratic system.  Indeed, between 1996 and 2001 
the percentage of those very satisfied and substantially satisfied with democracy reached its 
maximum in 1997 (35.5%) and then fell to its low point in 2000 (8.5%).36  
 
Another explanation for this increase in voter participation in the 1998 congressional and 
presidential elections might well not constitute a trend but rather a response to specific events in the 
political system. Thus the scandal surrounding the entry of drug money in Ernesto Samper’s 
presidential campaign might well have converted the elections into a plebiscite on the country’s 
future.  By April 1998, two months before the first round of the presidential elections, the climate of 
opinion regarding the future of the country was quite negative –  80% of those interviewed in a 
nation-wide survey thought that the country was moving in the wrong direction. 37   A similar 
scenario prevailed in the period immediately preceding the 2002 presidential elections, when 86% 
of a nation-wide sample believed  that the country was going in the wrong direction. 38 In contrast, 
when President Gaviria left office in 1994, a survey revealed that 66% of those questioned thought 
that his administration would be evaluated favourably in the history books, signifying that the 
climate of opinion regarding the outgoing Gaviria administration was considerably more favourable 
than that at the end of the next two governments.39 
 
A decline in abstention rates may be linked to Law 403 of August 1997, which introduced a series 
of incentives to voters. The year in which abstention in presidential and congressional elections was 
lowest, 1998, voters were eligible to receive several benefits for casting a vote:  (a) preference in 
obtaining employment in the public sector; (b) half a day´s paid leave; (c) a discount of 10% in fees 
for public universities;  (d) reductions in time for mandatory military service; and (e) preferences in 
awards of scholarships, housing subsidies and rural land. Implementation of these incentives could, 
therefore, be regarded as factors that encouraged people to vote. A survey conducted by 
Universidad de los Andes and the National Planning Department asked what motivated respondents 
to vote in the 2002 presidential and congressional elections –  thirteen percent  replied that the 
certificate that entitled them to benefits was a factor in their casting a ballot.    
 
Finally, abstention levels appear to reflect the relative importance for the voter of the office or 
collegiate body for which the election is being conducted.  Data thus show that the Senate is the 
government organisation that matters least to the voter, while the offices of president and mayors 
generate higher levels of mobilisation. The underlying reason for this difference of approach may 
be that the executive posts define public policy, while the collegiate bodies are seen as organisations 
of lesser political importance.40 In the case of local government posts, it is possible that the closer 
relationship between citizen and elected mayor is a stimulus to participation. Beyond that, the low 
                                                 
36 Daniel Zovatto, ‘Valores, percepciones y actitudes hacia la democracia. Una visión comparada latinoamericana, 
1996-2001’, in Observatorio electoral latinamericano, at http://www.observatorio 
electoral.org/biblioteca/?bookID=8&page=3. 
37 Napoleón Franco, ‘Estudio presidencial intención de voto y mapas preceptuales’, survey commissioned by EL 
Tiempo, Noticiero de la 7 , RCN Bogotá ,  21 April 1998, p. 9. 
38 Napoleón Franco, ‘La Gran Encuesta 4’, commissioned by El Tiempo, RCN Radio/TV and Semana, Bogotá, April 
2002, p. 11. 
39 ‘El adios’, Semana, 2-9 August 1998, p. 28. 
40 Regarding the difference of perceptions between executive posts and collegiate bodies see Lariza Pizano, 
‘Reflexiones sobre las decisiones electorales de los Bogotános’, Análisis Político, 45 (January-April 2002).  
 percentage of people who say that they have confidence in the legislature (the average for the 1990s 
was just 23.5%)41 may be another reason for the low level of electoral interest in the Senate. 
 
Additional data on electoral participation stems from a recent national survey commissioned by the 
Universidad de los Andes and the National Planning Department.42  First, the survey shows that 
there is a group that always votes: 46% in presidential elections and 39% in congressional elections. 
This shows that the presidency attracts more votes than the Senate or Chamber of Representatives. 
These percentages are thus the minimum that can be expected, and fluctuations above those levels 
depend on fringe voters who vote occasionally. Fringe voters constitute 29% of the sample for the 
presidential elections and 28% for congressional elections. 
 
Drawing upon the survey data, if we compare the percentage of people who always vote and the 
abstention figures for Congress and the presidency in 1990 and 1994, the proportion of people who 
always votes increased during the 1990s. Abstention was high in those two years:  54% for the 
presidency and 61% for Congress. The survey data suggest that these are maximum abstention 
rates.  The figures are calculated by adding the occasional voters (29% and 28%) to the permanent 
non-voters (20% and 29%).  Thus 1998 was the year in which abstention fell because of a greater 
presence of occasional voters and growth in the number of people who always vote. But what the 
survey data reveal regarding the 2002 elections is that occasional voters did not surface (the highest 
expected abstention is 54% and the actual figure was 53.5%) while for congressional elections they 
are only marginally present (expected abstention is 61% and actual abstention was 58.1%).    
 
A second finding of the survey relevant to the study of electoral participation relates to the reasons 
given by the sample for voting or for abstaining. Among those who voted, the five most common 
answers were:43  “I vote so that things will change” (57%); “I vote to do my duty as a citizen” 
(43%); “I vote to exercise the right to express an opinion and protest” (38%);  “I vote to protest 
against corruption” (28%); and I vote to save this country” (28%). Answers related to political 
militancy, “I vote to support a party” (12%) or “I vote because they gave me something in 
exchange/because I don´t want to lose my job”( 4%), were not common responses. 
 
For those who did not vote, the reasons offered related to distance from politics and politicians or 
disenchantment with them, along with structural factors: “I don´t vote because the candidates make 
promises they don´t keep” (34%); “I don´t vote because politics is corrupt” (34%); “I don’t vote 
because politics does nothing for me” (20%); “I don’t vote because I don’t understand  politics” 
(14%).44 Some people did not vote for ‘structural’ reasons; that is, for reasons beyond their control. 
For example, 15% said that they had not voted because they had lost their ID card, another 15% 
because they had not registered to vote in their city of residence; and 4% said that the polling station 
was too far away. 45  
 
Although the percentage is not very high, six percent indicated that they had not voted for fear of 
violence or violent reprisals, suggesting that the war has an impact on abstention rates, even if 
minimally.46 
                                                 
41 Rodolfo Masias & Marcela Ceballos, ‘Confianza en las instituciones: principales rasgos y algunos determinantes: 
Una aproximación a la década de los noventa en Colombia’, in Documentos del CESO. No. 2, Uniandes-CESO, 2001.  
42 Napoleón Franco, Estudio post-electoral. Elecciones, democracia y violencia. Informe, Bogotá, 2002. 
43 Interviewees were allowed to give more than one reason. 
44 Questions on reasons for voting or abstaining allowed more than one answer, and percentages therefore total more 
than 100. 
45 These ‘structural’ factors encourage abstention; but those who could not vote for reasons beyond their control might 
have voted under other circumstances. 
46 Because of  technical and logistical limitations of survey firms in Colombia, some related to the armed conflict, parts 
of the country are not included in national surveys. Samples therefore do not include people from departments with a 
  
Finally, the regularity of the election cycle in Colombia underscores the importance of elections as a 
mechanism of political participation.  Presidential elections have been staged without interruption 
since 1958, as have congressional elections except at the beginning of the 1990s when the Congress 
elected in that year was revoked and replaced temporarily with a Constituent Assembly.  Local and 
regional elections (mayors, municipal councils, governors and departmental assemblymen) have not 
been quite as regular.  Most municipalities have held their elections on scheduled dates, but some 
have been postponed because of public order problems, and others staged elections not on the 
electoral cycle for reasons of resignations or removal from office. 
 
 
Violence and Political Participation:  An Empirical Analysis.  
Thus far this study has revealed how the 2002 electoral process was affected by formidable 
pressures from armed groups.  Additionally, we presented an overview of the fluctuations in voter 
participation, along with alternative explanations of abstention rates.  This section offers an 
empirical analysis of the impact of political violence linked to armed conflict upon voter 
participation, based upon the 2002 elections for the lower house of Congress.   The methodology 
involves the utilization of two regression models that permit an assessment of the impact of 
violence variables on the dependent variable, abstention.  The incidence of violence on the 
dependent variable is analyzed for all of Colombia’s municipalities for which data were available 
(The number of municipalities in the following analyses ranges between 903 and 1044). In addition, 
we shall examine the relationship between political violence and abstention in each of the thirty-two 
departments and the special electoral district for Bogotá. The second part of the empirical analysis 
evaluates the significance of dependent variables other than those related to violence on electoral 
abstention. This will involve the utilization of logistical regressions of variables from the data base 
constructed for the project which was financed by the National Planning Agency (DNP).  
 
The dependent variable abstention (ABSTEN) is operationalised by dividing the total number of 
votes cast for Chamber candidates for the lower chamber in each municipality by the potential 
electorate in each, and subtracting that figure from 100.47  Then the abstention rates were correlated 
with eleven independent variables, seven of which correspond to different measurements of 
violence.  
 
The first group of independent variables corresponds to the presence or absence of armed groups in 
a given territory. Here, there are three variables:  (1) GUERRILL, which corresponds to the 
presence of one of four guerrilla groups in a municipality; (2) PARAS, the presence of paramilitary 
groups; and (3) TODACARM, a variable that identifies municipalities in which both guerrillas and 
paramilitaries are present simultaneously.48  
  
The second constellation of variables measures the incidence of different actions that  armed groups 
stage in each municipality or department. The variable ACCIOGUE measures guerrilla actions in 
each municipality or department for the period 2000-2001, as a percentage of total actions reported 
in Colombia during the same period. The variable MASACRES is employed as a measure of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
strong guerrilla presence (Arauca, Caquetá and Putumayo). It is therefore highly likely that the effect of the war on 
political participation is understated in the study.  
47 Abstention was not calculated as a percentage of valid votes because the information on blank votes was not available 
for municipalities. 
48 For the analysis that takes the municipality as the unit of analysis, these variables are treated as dichotomous or 
dummy variables. Where the department is the unit of analysis, the presence of armed groups is used as a continuous 
variable, more specifically presence is measured as a percentage (i.e., percentage of municipalities in the department 
with the presence of one or the other type of armed group, or both). Measurements are calculated with information 
supplied by National Planning Department .  
 paramilitary actions.49  MASACRES, calculated similarly to ACCIOGUE, is defined as a 
percentage of the massacres in each municipality or department divided by the national totals for 
2000.50  
 
The third group of variables measures the incidence of violent homicides at municipal or 
departmental level.  HPCH is the murder rate per 100,000 population in 2001, and MPCH is the 
death-rate in massacres per 100,000 population in 2000.51  
 
The final set of variables is composed of POLICIA, a variable which identifies the municipalities 
which do or do not enjoy the presence of the National Police;52 ESTADO, which is an indicator of 
State presence;53 ECONOMIA which is  a measure of the standard of living in the municipalities 
and departments;54 and POBLACIO, which is a measurement of the number of inhabitants in a 
municipality or department.55 This final group of variables acts as a set of control variables that are 
incorporated into the analysis to evaluate a few classical hypotheses appearing in the Colombian 
literature to explain electoral abstention.  More specifically, we shall examine the relationship 
between abstention and population density, socio-economic development, and State and police 
presence.56  
 
The following consists of a set of hypotheses that we shall evaluate through statistical analyses: 
  
H1. Higher levels of electoral abstention are linked to guerrilla presence in a municipality or to a 
major presence of guerrillas in a department;  
H 2. Lower levels of abstention are linked to the presence of paramilitary groups in a municipality, 
or a greater presence of the paramilitaries in a department.  
H 3. Lower levels of abstention are associated with the simultaneous presence of guerrillas and 
paramilitaries; 
H 4. Levels of abstention increase if there is a greater incidence of military action on the part of 
guerrillas in a municipality or a department;  
                                                 
49 Massacres are used as a measure of paramilitary activity because throughout the 1990s this was their principal 
strategy. This does not signify that other armed groups do or do not use that form of action. 
50 Information on massacres and murders was provided by the Office of the Public Defender and  the Judicial Police, 
DIJIN. 
51 The HPCH variable was calculated from information supplied by DIJIN, and the figures for municipal population are 
from the National Statistical Institute, DANE. MPCH is calculated on the basis of massacre information supplied by the 
Office of the Public Defender. 
52 Like the variables which measure the presence of armed groups, the variable police presence is used as a dummy 
when the unit of analysis is the municipality. When the unit of analysis is the department, the variable becomes a 
percentage (municipalities with police presence divided by the total number of municipalities in the department). Data 
were supplied by the Ministry of Defense. 
53 This index considers indicators of (1) State presence; (2) State spending;  (3) municipal/departmental financial 
capacity; and (4) physical presence of institutions in the towns. Luis Sandoval & Constanza Téllez, ‘La presencia 
territorial y la capacidad institucional y de gestión del Estado’, in Fundación Social (ed.), Municipios y Regiones, Una 
mirada desde la sociedad civil,  Bogotá: Fundación Social, 1998,  pp.146-163. 
54 This index consists of a measurement of  “12 variables which measure  potential of access to and enjoyment of goods 
and services in the medium-term,“ The indicators are related to (a) “human capital resources available in the context of 
the market,” (b)“potential generated by access to physical goods represented in a lifestyle,” and (c) “the structure and 
size of the family”  (Libardo Sarmiento & Clara Ramírez, ‘Tipología municipal con base en las condiciones de vida’, in 
Fundación Social (1998), pp. 247-261). 
55 Population data taken from DANE. 
56 In the Colombian literature, it has been suggested that the higher the social and economic standards of individuals, the 
more likely they are to vote (Elsa Gómez, La elección presidencial de 1982 en Bogotá: dinámica de la opinion 
electoral , Bogotá: ANIF, 1982, p. 61). In the context of the statistical analysis in this section, socio-economic 
conditions are analysed at the macro level (departmental and municipal) by means of the developmental indicator. 
 
 H 5. Levels of and abstention increase where there is a higher incidence of massacres in a 
municipality or department;  
H 6. Higher levels of abstention are associated with higher murder rates per 100,000 population; 
H 7. Higher abstention is associated with higher death rates resulting from massacres per 100,000 
population;  
H 8.   Lower levels of abstention are linked to higher levels of State presence;  
H 9.   Lower levels of abstention are associated with police presence; 
H 10. Lower levels of abstention are linked to better living conditions; and  
H 11. Higher levels of abstention are associated with higher population densities.  
 
In order to evaluate the above hypotheses, a number of regression models were applied that 
included four variable sets discussed above. Then a regression model was developed using the 
method of variable selection in successive steps. This method allowed for the construction of a 
robust regression model that generated the selection of variables that best explained the behaviour 
of the dependent variable, abstention. As mentioned above, this regression strategy was applied to 
all the country’s municipalities for which data existed. Also, the strategy of running several 
regression models by variable sets was applied in the analyses using departments as units of 
analysis. The departmental runs were undertaken to offer a more extensive interpretation of the 
impact of violence on Colombia’s voting population. In both cases, returns for the 2002 Chamber of 
Representatives are utilized.  
 
The first model employed for municipalities (Table 3) offers empirical evidence supporting 
Hypothesis 1. This reveals that areas dominated by the guerrillas display higher levels of abstention 
than in those where guerrillas are not present or have not consolidated their hegemony. As 
mentioned earlier, FARC guerrillas promoted a strategy to boycott the elections during the 
presidential and congressional election campaigns, a strategy that enjoyed some success, as revealed 
by the statistical model. On the other hand, for Hypothesis 2, the postulated relationship between 
paramilitary presence and lower abstention rates is not sustained, thereby requiring the rejection of 
Hypothesis 2.  In fact, paramilitary presence slightly increases electoral abstention at the municipal 
level. See Table 3. However, the data are insufficient to assess the success of the paramilitaries’ 
strategy of penetrating the political system through promotion of specific candidates for elective 
office and opposition to others.  Finally, the first model offers evidence unfavourable to Hypothesis 
3, which states that in areas where both paramilitaries and guerrillas are present abstention rates are 
lower than in areas under the territorial control of the guerrilla.  The relationship between the 
variable TODACARM and abstention is quite weak and not in the predicted direction. Thus 
Hypothesis 3 is rejected because the significance level is minimal.57 This contradicts Kalyvas’ 
assertion that where sovereignty has not been consolidated by one or other of the armed groups, this 
prevents them from successful attempts to influence or thwart political participation. 58 Indeed, most 
of these disputed areas remain under the sovereignty of the State, thereby offering an explanation as 
to why abstention is not affected drastically in those sites.  
 
 
Table 3 - Model 1 
 
                                                 
57 Of course, there are documented cases of disputes between armed groups of the same type, i.e., guerrillas have fought 
guerrillas for territory ( Arauca) and paramilitaries have engaged in combat with paramilitaries  (Sierra Nevada of Santa 
Marta). 
58 Sthatis Kalyvas, ‘La violencia en medio de la guerra civil. Esbozo de una teoría’, Análisis Político, 42 (January-April 
2001), p.22. 
 Dependent Variable 
Abstention    
 Coefficients  (St Err.) 
Standardized 
Coefficients  Significance 
(Constant) 59.198                                     (0.663)  0.000 
GUERRILL 6.18 (0.938) 0.242
 0.000 
PARAS 1.126 (1.182) 0.039 0.536 
TODACARM .050 (2.133) 0.002 0.981 
    
N 918   
R2 0.065   
Adjusted R2 0.062   
 
 
 
 
The second regression model for municipalities (Table 4) offers empirical support for Hypothesis 4 
that guerrilla actions affect participation by increasing abstention levels. This finding reinforces 
results of the first regression model – guerrilla presence negatively affects participation. Again, 
what this reflects is the effect of the strategy to sabotage the 2002 elections. With regard to 
Hypothesis 5, the regression model fails to offer statistical support for its acceptance. Thus, we 
cannot conclude that massacres as a form of paramilitary action affect political participation. The 
massacre strategy basically seeks to discourage people from supporting the guerrillas rather than 
impeding electoral participation. 
 
 
 
Table 4 - Model 2 
 
Dependent Variable 
Abstention 
   
 Coefficients  (St Err.) 
Standardized 
Coefficients  Significance 
(Constant) 61.351 (0.458)  0.000 
MASACRES  1.221 (1.428) 0.027 0.410 
ACCIOGUE 13.622 (2.146) 0.206 0.000 
    
N 1044   
R2 0.047   
Adjusted R2 0.045   
 
 
 
The third model (Table 5) offers statistical support for the hypotheses regarding the incidence of 
both homicides (H6) and deaths from massacres (H7). The relationship between murder rates, both 
homicides and massacres, and abstention rates shown in the model supports both hypotheses in a 
statistically significant manner.  This finding reveals that political as well as non-political violence 
 affects political participation.  Thus municipalities affected by high levels of criminal activity and 
political violence represent contexts in which participation in public life is thwarted. 
 
 
Table 5 - Model 3 
 
Dependent Variable 
Abstention 
   
 Coefficients  (St Err.) 
Standardized 
Coefficients  Significance 
(Constant) 60.402 (0.507)  0.000 
HPCH 0.029 0.005 0.192 0.000 
MPCH 0.065 0.019 0.115 0.001 
    
N 964   
R2 0.066   
Adjusted R2 0.064   
 
 
The fourth model for municipalities (Table 6) includes socio-economic variables, which, though not 
statistically significant (except ECONOM at the .045 level), sustain the direction of Hypotheses 8, 
9, 10 and 11.   That is, State and police presence, along with higher standards of living, promote 
political participation in the sense that the signs of the predicted relationships are in the right 
direction.   The sign of the coefficient obtained for the variable population indicates that higher 
population densities coincide with higher abstention levels.  
 
Table 6 - Model 4 
 
Dependent Variable 
Abstention 
   
 Coefficients  
(St Err.) 
Standardized 
Coefficients  Significance 
(Constant) 68.804 
(6.454) 
 0.000 
POLICÍA -1.060 
(1.268) 
-0.028 0.403 
ESTADO -0.197 
(0.469) 
-0.047 0.675 
ECONOMÍA  -0.120 
(0.060) 
-0.078 0.045 
POBLACIO 1.082E-05 
(0.000) 
-0.091 0.432 
N 979   
R2 0.006   
Adjusted R2 0.002   
 
 
 
Table 7 - Model 5  
 
Dependent Variable 
Abstention 
    
  Coefficients  
(St Err.) 
Standardized 
Coefficients  
Significance 
(Constant) 60.256   (1.092)  0.000 
GUERRILL 4.848 (0.815) 0.192
 0.000 
HPCH 0.020 (0.005) 0.141 0.000 
ACCIOGUE 8.601 (1.918) 0.149 0.000 
MPCH 0.052 (0.018) 0.096 0.004 
ECONOM  
-0.131 
0.047 -0.089 0.005 
N 903   
R2 0.138   
Adjusted R2 0.133   
 
Finally, the fifth regression model based on municipalities (Table 7) employs the method of 
variable selection by successive steps, allowing for the incorporation of all the independent 
variables in the statistical analysis. With this procedure, a model emerged that included the five 
independent variables most closely related to the dependent variable, electoral abstention: guerrilla 
presence, homicides, guerrilla actions, massacres, and living conditions.  
 
In general terms, the coefficient obtained for each variable in the regression model sustains the 
proposed hypotheses, along with results of the foregoing                                       
models. Thus presence of guerrillas is a variable associated with higher levels of abstention. 
Likewise, higher rates of homicide, guerrilla actions, and massacres decrease political participation, 
while higher living standards in a municipality are associated with higher rates of electoral 
participation.  Where the guerrillas have consolidated their control, electoral participation is 
affected negatively because abstention represents a political strategy of the guerrilla.  According to 
Ferro and Uribe, members of FARC’s Secretariat maintain that FARC formulated a strategy of 
sabotaging elections for the first time in 1997 as a reaction to the massacre of UP members.59 
Testimony of a guerrilla commander reflects the development of that strategy in areas controlled by 
that armed group: 
In the 1997 elections, perhaps for the first time, we began to talk about abstention. 
There were a number of reasons for this, one of which reacted to the Establishment’s 
annihilation of the opposition, especially the UP although that is not the only case... we 
said that democracy in Colombia was severely restricted because at that time there was 
no possibility that other sectors not in some way related to the  Establishment could take 
part. It is the reason why we call on people to abstain as a way of discrediting the 
system, and Colombia’s form of democracy, which is simply the exercise of casting a 
vote, and no more than that.60  
We could not say, we're going to boycott these elections. We have no capacity to do so. 
What we did say was that in the areas in which we control, we are not going to allow 
the traditional parties to make hay...Therefore we said we are going to control some 
areas, not all, because coalitions were negotiated in some places.61 
 
                                                 
59 Juan Guillermo Ferro & Graciela Uribe, El orden de la guerrra. Las FARC entre la organización y la política , 
Bogotá: Universidad Javeriana, 2002. 
60 Ferro & Uribe (2002), p.139. 
61 Ferro & Uribe (2002), p.140. 
 Another result of the statistical analysis that is quite relevant to this point is that in areas where 
paramilitaries and guerrillas are both present, levels of abstention tend not to be affected 
significantly. In areas where armed groups are struggling to establish territorial control, military 
confrontation between guerrillas and paramilitaries prevents the FARC from implementing its 
actions to undermine elections.  Thus restrictions on participation are associated with the 
establishment of military control that allows an armed group to implement strategies of political 
control over the local population.  In cases where military disputes between armed groups exist, 
they are interested more in the consolidation of military and territorial control than political control, 
which represents a second phase of local penetration.  
 
Inclusion of variables measuring living standards and police presence, shown in Model 5, suggest 
that abstention is lower in municipalities where the forces of law and order are conspicuous.  It is 
less likely that guerrillas will be successful in implementing their  strategy of thwarting elections.62  
Finally, areas characterized by high levels of economic development manifest the lowest degrees of 
abstention. Thus a variable not associated with armed conflict represents a relevant explanation of 
electoral abstention.  
 
The next stage of the analysis consists of utilizing the same variables as in the previous portion of 
the paper based upon municipalities, but shifting the units of analysis to the departments. Because 
of the diversity in political violence manifested at the municipal level within departments, the 
expectation is that results of the departmental level analyses will be less robust than at the municipal 
level.       
  
The first model (Table 7) reflects an impact of the variables guerrilla and paramilitary presence, 
similar to the results presented in Model 1 for municipalities (Table 3). A guerrilla presence 
encourages higher levels of abstention, while paramilitary presence operates in the reverse 
direction. However, neither relationship is significant at the .05 level.  The sign of the coefficient of 
the variable simultaneous presence of guerrillas and paramilitaries is positive, thus suggesting that 
abstention mounts in those sites. However, Hypothesis 3 is not sustained statistically (abstention 
tends to decrease in areas disputed by guerrillas and paramilitaries). To the contrary, the sign of the 
coefficient in Model 1 by departments is that the presence of both guerrillas and paramilitaries at 
the same time encourages high levels of abstention.   The significance levels of the results for 
variables included in Model 1 by departments are not robust.  
 
 
Table 8 - Model 1 
 
Dependent Variable 
Abstention 
   
 Coefficients  (St Err.) 
Standardized 
Coefficients  Significance 
(Constant) 55.686 (2.560)  0.000 
GUERRILL 9.490 (5338) 0.400 0.086 
PARAS -11.717 (10.403) -0.345 0.270 
TODACARM 9.891 (12.755) 0.281 0.445 
    
N 32*   
                                                 
62 In two of the four municipalities in the sample where there was no police presence, some of the highest abstention 
figures were recorded. 
 R2 0.223   
Adjusted R2 0.140   
 
*For this Table, data on guerrilla presence is not available for one department, leaving thirty-two electoral districts for 
analysis. 
 
 
 
The second model (Table 8) shows results similar to those of the municipal Model 2 (Table 4). 
Departments with high levels of guerrilla activity tend to register higher levels of abstention. Also, 
the variable massacres, an approximation of paramilitary action, is inversely related to abstention. 
In this Model only the variable guerrilla actions displays a coefficient with a relatively high degree 
of significance.  
 
Table 8 - Model 2 
 
Dependent  
Variable  
Abstention 
   
 Coefficients  (St Err.) 
Standardized 
Coefficients  Significance 
(Constant) 57.006 (1.509)  0.000 
ACCIOGUE 98.476 (35.201) 0.490 0.009 
MASACRES -9.228 (23.468) -0.069 0.697 
    
N 33   
R2 0.219   
Adjusted R2 0.167   
 
 
 
Similar to Model 3 of the municipal analysis, Table 9 includes the independent variables of 
homicides and deaths by massacres, revealing a positive relationship between ho micides and 
electoral abstention.  This finding shows that expressions of violence, political or otherwise, stifle 
voter interest in elections.  Results obtained in this regression model for deaths by massacre were 
not statistically significant.  
 
 
 
Table 9 - Model 3 
 
Dependent Variable 
Abstention 
   
 Coefficients  (St Err.) 
Standardized 
Coefficients  Significance 
(Constant) 54.987 (2.053)  0.000 
HPCH 0.101 (0.028) 0.576 0.001 
MPCH 0.214 (0.220) -0.153 0.339 
    
 N 33   
R2 0.307   
Adjusted R2 0.261   
 
 
 
The fourth regression model (Table 10), based upon socio-economic variables, reveals that none of 
these factors impacted on abstention at the departmental level.  
 
 
 
Table 10 - Model 4 
 
Dependent Variable 
Abstention 
   
 Coefficients 
(St Err.) 
Standardized 
Coefficients  
Significance 
(Constant) 70.319 (8.401)  0.000 
ECONOMÍA -0.159 (0.243) -0.365 0.519 
POLICÍA -11.703 (10.374) -0.225 0.269 
ESTADO 0.191 (0.231) 0.441 0.416 
POBLACIO 1.815E-07 (0.000) 0.038 0.921 
    
N 33   
R2 0.084   
Adjusted R2 -0.052   
 
 
Finally, the last departmental model (Table 11), constructed by the method of successive steps, 
selected only one independent variable included in that analysis, namely homicides. What this 
model underscores is that murder rates dramatically affect electoral abstention. This model indicates 
that guerrilla presence is not the only factor that affects political participation; exclusion of this 
variable from the model had no impact at the departmental level, only in those areas the FARC 
controls.  Thus while the guerrillas have succeeded in staging military operations in many parts of 
the country, this has not resulted in territorial control, which carries with it lower abstention rates.  
Moreover, guerrilla domination is concentrated in areas with low population densities, areas largely 
on the periphery, not in urban areas where the population tends to be concentrated.  Finally, as 
noted above, because of the heterogeneity of Colombia’s departments in terms of guerrilla and 
paramilitary actions, municipalities are more appropriate units of analysis than departments.   
 
 
Table 11 - Model 5 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions  
The third wave of democracy and institutional engineering that swept Latin America during the 
1980s and 1990s underscored an active citizen involvement in the “new” democracies.  Particular 
emphasis was placed upon the sovereignty of the people and mechanisms of direct democracy, such 
as referenda, recall, and plebiscites.  Yet, as argued in this paper, the extent of political participation 
in democratic regimes remains inconclusive in part because of differing conceptualisations not only 
of political participation but democracy as well.  What is an appropriate level of electoral 
participation for the promotion of democratic consolidation?  What is the relationship between 
political participation and governability?  To what extent are mechanisms of direct democracy 
compatible with representative democracy?  These are tough questions that cannot be answered 
satisfactorily in the abstract.  Additional factors or variables necessarily must be included in the 
analysis as well, such as the institutionalisation of political organizations and governmental entities, 
leadership characteristics, historical and political trajectories, the strength of civil society, economic 
performance, and contextual challenges confronting the political system.   
 
Nonetheless, political participation constitutes a fundamental pillar of both direct and representative 
democracy despite the empirical and theoretical ambiguities surrounding the concept.  This paper 
has focused upon two fundamental components of electoral participation in Colombia: (1) the 
opportunity structure associated with the political system and (2) the incidence and salience of 
specific contextual issues in the 2002 electoral campaigns.  With respect to the first, the 
constitutional foundations of the Colombian political system offer ample opportunities for 
Colombians to participate actively in the electoral process.  Yet contextual factors associated with 
elevated levels of political violence stemming from guerrilla, paramilitary, narco and common 
criminal activities contributed to higher abstention rates during the 2002 elections than otherwise 
would have been the case.  Moreover, a tradition of electoral abstention, related in part to the non-
obligatory vote, represented another factor that elevated the abstention rate.   
 
This article has evaluated the impact of political violence on the dynamics of Colombian elections, 
more specifically the 2002 elections to the lower house of Congress.  After discussing some 
theoretical and methodological tenets associated with the concepts of democracy and political 
participation, the next section presented an overview of the assaults upon Colombian democracy 
during the 2002 electoral campaigns, emphasizing activities of guerrilla and paramilitary groups 
that had an impact on the campaign, especially the intimidation of candidates, the kidnapping of 
politicians, deaths associated with political violence, and FARC’s strategy of boycotting the 
elections.  Obviously, the context in which the elections unfolded was not ideal in terms of 
democratic consolidation, but nonetheless failed to undermine the legitimacy of the electoral 
process.  In the following section, the emphasis shifted to the major focus of this study, namely 
electoral participation.  Electoral abstention in Colombia traditionally has exceeded that of 
Dependent Variable 
Abstention 
   
 Coefficients (St Err.) 
Standardized 
Coefficients  Significance 
(Constant) 53.453 (1.997)  0.000 
HPCH 0.102 (0.028) 0.563 0.001 
    
N 33   
R2 0.317   
Adjusted R2 0.294   
 European and Latin American countries, in part for reasons of the non-obligatory nature of the vote 
in Colombia.    
 
Subsequent sections of the article consisted of quantitative analyses of the impact of violence upon 
electoral abstention.  The dynamics of violence that plague Colombian society are generating 
negative effects upon the electoral process, especially in areas controlled by the FARC guerrillas.  
Despite that strategy, the data reveal, and the guerrillas acknowledge, that its success was limited 
largely to areas where they enjoy territorial domination.  The impact of political violence upon 
electoral participation suggests a growing challenge to democratic institutions and organizations in 
the country, but not to the extent of undermining the legitimacy associated with the electoral 
process.  To this point, the capacity of political institutions to resist assaults of armed groups is 
rather remarkable, reflecting a long tradition of institutionalized elections upon which Colombian 
democracy rests.  
 
The municipal- level analyses suggest that abstention rates increase with guerrilla presence, high 
rates of homicides and massacres, and high incidences of guerrilla activity.  In contrast, abstention 
tends to decrease in those municipalities with higher living standards.  At the departmental level, 
only homicide rates and guerrilla activity impact negatively on participation rates.  One of the 
significant findings of this study suggests that non-political as well as political violence affects the 
involvement of Colombian citizens in the electoral process.  Unlike the guerrillas, non-political 
agents of violence have not formulated a strategy to undercut the electoral process, but their actions 
discourage active citizen involvement.  Thus public policy designed to reduce homicidal violence 
not only would defend life, but the robustness of Colombia’s democracy as well.  Linkages between 
violence and electoral abstent ion established in this study pose questions yet unanswered as to the 
differential impact of political and non-political violence upon electoral abstention.  
 
In summary, although Colombian democracy is under assault from armed actors and undermined by 
socio-economic factors, its viability has not been contested to the point of regime collapse, nor is 
that likely to occur in the near future.  While it is appropriate to label Colombia a crisis state, 
neither the parameters nor the intensity of the crisis permit either theoretical or empirical 
conclusions as to the calibre or endurance of its democratic regime.  For the past fifty or so years, 
the Colombian State has been characterized by perpetual crisis, and that is not likely to change in 
the foreseeable future.  
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